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Casenote

Finding Immunity: Manders v. Lee and the
Erosion of § 1983 Liability

In Manders v. Lee,' the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit held that a Georgia county sheriff is an arm of the
state when acting in his official capacity in implementing and enforcing
use-of-force guidelines and, thus, is immune from suit in federal court
under the Eleventh Amendment.' This decision creates considerable
uncertainty in the area of government-entity liability under 42 U.S.C.
§ 19833 because of the potentially broad impact of this newly established analytical approach.
I.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

In May of 1997, Willie Santonio Manders was arrested by the City of
Homerville Police for punching a police officer. While Sheriff Deputy
Brown and a city police officer were leading Manders into his cell, a
different police officer stated that Manders hit him earlier. Sheriff
Deputy Brown and the city police officer assisting him then began
hitting Manders, repeatedly striking him across the face, neck, and head,

1.
2.
3.

338 F.3d 1304 (11th Cir. 2003).
Id. at 1328; U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2003).
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and ramming his head into the wall. Manders sustained physical
injuries to his face and suffered emotional injuries that eventually
resulted in a mental hospital stay.4
Manders filed his amended complaint in the United States District
Court for the Middle District of Georgia on April 20, 1999, alleging
numerous claims against several defendants.5 The majority of the
claims against the numerous defendants were eventually dismissed;
however, the district court denied Sheriff Peterson's6 motion for
summary judgment with respect to Manders's "use-of-force policy
claims 7 under § 1983 against ... Sheriff Peterson in his official
capacity."8 Sheriff Peterson then filed a motion for reconsideration,
asserting that he was entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity. After
the district court denied his motion for reconsideration, Sheriff Peterson
filed an interlocutory appeal with the Eleventh Circuit Court of
Appeals
Following circuit precedent that treated suits against Georgia sheriffs
acting in their official capacity as suits against a county, instead of as
suits against the state, the court of appeals reluctantly affirmed the
district court's denial of summary judgment.'1 However, because the
precedent decisions did not analyze whether a sheriff actually represents
either the state or the county under Georgia law, the court questioned
the correctness of those decisions." Subsequently, the court of appeals
voted to vacate the panel opinion affirming the denial of summary
judgment and ordered the case reheard en banc." On July 28, 2003,
the Eleventh Circuit issued its decision in the case of Manders v. Lee,"
determining that Georgia sheriffs act as an arm of the state when

4. 338 F.3d at 1306.
5. Id.
6. "As elected sheriff for Clinch County, Georgia, Sheriff Peterson is responsible for
operating the jail in Clinch County, for establishing policy and procedures at the jail, and
for hiring, training, and supervising his deputies who work in the jail." Id.
7. "According to Manders, deputy Brown beat him, and Clinch County and Sheriff
Peterson permitted deputy Brown's use of excessive force. Manders also asserts that
Clinch County and Sheriff Peterson failed to provide deputies proper training and oversight
regarding use of force at the jail and failed to promulgate rules and regulations adequate
to regulate deputies conduct, and that this failure caused the beating suffered by Manders."
Manders v. Lee, 285 F.3d 983, 988 (11th Cir.), vacated by, 300 F.3d 1298 (11th Cir. 2002).
8. Id. at 989.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 1009.
11. Id.
12. Manders v. Lee, 300 F.3d 1298 (11th Cir. 2002).
13. 338 F.3d 1304 (11th Cir. 2003).
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establishing or implementing use-of-force policies generally, and, in
particular, at a county-funded and county-managed jail.' 4
II.

LEGAL BACKGROUND

The central question addressed in Manders-when does a sub-state
entity act on the state's behalf-occurs at the intersection of two legal
doctrines: Eleventh Amendment immunity 5 and claims based on 42
U.S.C. § 1983.16 The Eleventh Amendment, in recognition that the
states retain certain attributes of sovereignty, largely shields states from
suits in federal court. 17 It was passed after the Revolutionary War
primarily out of concern that the heavily indebted states would be forced
to answer for their debts in federal court, thus leading to their financial
destruction. 18
The Civil Rights Act of 1871 was introduced as a bill to "enforce the
provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the
United States,""9 and to suppress "Ku Klux Klan violence in the
Southern States. 2 ' The bill's first section, later codified as 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, secured federal rights by giving a broad remedy to any citizen
subjected to violations of federally protected civil rights at the hands of
officers of the state.2 ' Legislative history indicates that the Civil
Rights Act of 1871 was aimed at sheriffs whose active participation, tacit
approval, or22 neglect of duty caused the violation of federally protected
civil rights.

14. Id. at 1305-06.
15. Amendment XI of the U.S. Constitution provides: "The Judicial power of the
United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or
prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or
Subjects of any Foreign State."
16. Section 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,oregulation, custom, or
usage, of any State ...subjects or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United
States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be
liable to the party injured in an action at law ....
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2003).
17. Hess v. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 513 U.S. 30, 39 (1994).
18. Id.
19. Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 665 (1977).
20. Id.
21. Id. at 665-86. The bill was divided into four parts. Part 1, later codified as 42
U.S.C. § 1983, and parts 2-4, which dealt mostly with Ku Klux Klan violence. Id.
22. See id.
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Although § 1983 liability extends only to "persons,"23 the Supreme
Court in Monell v. Department of Social Services of New York 24 held
that "persons" includes local governments and municipalities.2" While
expanding the definition of "persons" falling under the ambit of § 1983,
Monell also significantly narrowed the reach of § 1983 liability against
local governments and municipalities by holding that the constitutionally
violative conduct must be carried out "pursuant to official municipal
policy of some nature"26 instead of by mere tortious activity of an
employee acting contrary to official sanction. The requisite policy can
be made by its lawmakers or by one whose "edicts or acts may fairly be
said to represent official policy." 28 The Supreme Court, however,
expressly chose to save for another day development of the full contours
of municipal liability under § 1983.29
Ten years later, in City of St. Louis v. Propotnick, ° the Supreme
Court seized the opportunity to further clarify § 1983 municipal, county,
or other local-entity liability by elaborating on the method courts should
follow in determining where policymaking authority lies. Recognizing
that state law, including "custom or usage" having the force of law,
governs this determination, the Court stated in Jett v. Dallas Independent School District"'that in deciding § 1983 municipal liability claims,
the trial court must first identify the official or government body that
acts with final policymaking authority regarding the action alleged to
have caused the constitutional violation. Once the final policymaking
officials have been identified, the court must then determine whether the
constitutional violation was caused directly by their decisions or by their
acquiescence in a long standing practice or custom constituting
"'standard operating procedure.'" 2

23. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2003).
24. 436 U.S. 658 (1977).
25. Id. at 694 (overruling Part III of Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961)). Although
when Monroe was decided it appeared that its extension of § 1983 liability to local
government subentities also applied to states themselves--all of which might be considered
to be acting "under color of state law," the operative phrase in § 1983-the Supreme Court
held otherwise in 1989. In Will v. MichiganDepartmentof State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989),
the Court held that a state was not a § 1983 "person" and therefore could not be sued
under that statute in any court, state or federal.
26. Id. at 691.
27. Id. "We conclude, therefore, that a local government may not be sued under § 1983
for an injury inflicted solely by its employees or agents." Id. at 694.
28. Id. at 694.
29. Id. at 694-95.
30. 485 U.S. 112 (1988).
31. 491 U.S. 701, 737 (1989).
32. Id.
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In the foregoing cases, it was uncontroverted that a city's or county's
final policymaker was acting for the city or county who employed him.
But in McMillian v. Monroe County," the Supreme Court addressed
which entity an Alabama sheriff (whom both parties agreed was the
official policymaker for § 1983 purposes) represented when inflicting the
unconstitutional injury at issue.' The Court announced two principles
that governed the decision of the preliminary question whether an injury
inflictor was a "final policymaking official" at all. 3' The first principle
is whether the government official has final policymaking authority for
the local government in that "particular area of the government's
business, or on that particular issue,"36 as opposed to having final
policymaking authority in an all-or-nothing categorical sense. 7 Second,
the analysis of the official's function in a local government is dependent
on how relevant state law defines the official's functions.3 8
In McMillian the sheriff allegedly suppressed exculpatory evidence
and testimony and coerced a codefendant to give inculpating evidence
resulting in an alleged unconstitutional capital conviction against the
defendant.3 9 Accordingly, the Supreme Court identified the localgovernment function at issue in this case as law enforcement.40 The
Court then grappled with whether the sheriff exercised this lawenforcement function on behalf of the county or the State of Alabama.4 1
If the county sheriff was exercising law-enforcement authority on behalf
of the county as the county's final policymaker, the county could be
liable for its actions under § 1983.42 If, on the other hand, the sheriff
was acting on behalf of the state, the functional defendant would be the
state itself; and because states sued in their own name are not "persons"
capable of being sued under § 1983, in state or federal court, no
government would be liable for the sheriff's allegedly unconstitutional
conduct."

33. 520 U.S. 781 (1997).
34. Id. at 783.
35. Id. at 785.
36. Id. "[The] question is whether school district superintendent 'possessed final
policymaking authority in the area of employee transfers.'" Id. (quoting Jett v. Dallas
Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 738 (1989)).
37. Id. at 785.
38. Id. at 786.
39. Id. at 783.
40. Id. at 785-86.

41. Id.
42.
43.

See Will v. Mich. Dep't of Police, 491 U.S. 58, 58 (1988).
Id.
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To answer the question whether the sheriff in Alabama possessed final
policymaking authority for the county or the state when acting in a law
enforcement capacity, the Court first turned to the supreme law of the
state, the Alabama Constitution." Framed in its current form in 1901,
the Alabama Constitution states that each county sheriff is an executive
official who is impeachable by the Alabama Supreme Court for neglect
of duty.45 This fact weighed heavily in favor of classifying the sheriff
as a state officer.4 ' Turning to the Alabama Code, the Court found
supportive, but less compelling, evidence tending toward classifying
sheriffs as state officers. 4' First, the sheriff is charged with attending
to the state courts in his county and must obey orders given by the
judge, who is a state official." Second, the sheriff must give to the
county treasurer a written statement detailing the funds received for the
county and must pay these to the treasurer, but the treasurer cannot
direct the sheriff to take specific actions, thus showing a lack of
control. 4' Third and most important, the sheriff is given complete
authority to enforce Alabama state criminal law.50 A county has no
such power and may not instruct the sheriff in his duties." Whereas
the county does not exercise control over the sheriff, the governor and
attorney general can exercise control by directing the sheriff to
investigate violations of state law in the sheriff's counties and report
those findings to the charging officer.52
Juxtaposed against the state constitutional findings and the three
statutory provisions supporting the conclusion that sheriffs are state
officials, the Court held four other provisions collectively insufficient to
tip the balance in favor of the conclusion that Alabama sheriffs exercised
law-enforcement functions on behalf of Alabama counties: (1) the
sheriff's salary is paid out of the county treasury, (2) the county provides
equipment and other necessities reasonably needed for the sheriff to

44. McMillian, 520 U.S. at 787.
45. The 1901 revision of the Alabama Constitution sought to remedy reports of sheriffs
who either allowed or sanctioned lynching of prisoners by centralizing control over the
sheriff by making the sheriff an executive officer, making such neglect of duty an
impeachable offense, and by removing impeachment authority from the county to the
Alabama Supreme Court. Thus, sheriffs share the same impeachment procedures as state
legal officers, instead of those of county and municipal officers. Id. at 788.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 789.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 790.
50. Id.

51.

Id.

52.

Id. at 791.
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execute his duties, (3) the sheriff's jurisdiction is limited to his county's
borders, and (4) the local county voters elect the county sheriff.53 The
Court discounted these factors by emphasizing that they afforded the
county scant control over the sheriff with respect to law-enforcement
functions.54 Although the Court in McMillian did not explicitly rely on
Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence and analysis in reaching its
conclusion, the Court's reasoning on these factors mirrors the approach
the Supreme Court used in determining, for Eleventh Amendment
purposes, when a sub-state entity acts on behalf of a state.55
Before conclusively settling the issue, the Court dispelled two other
concerns potentially weighing against the sheriff's status as a state
officer. 6 First, the Court examined the history of the sheriff's office in
Alabama to demonstrate how the sheriff can be a state policymaker only
in his elected county, even though normally a state policymaker is
elected by all state voters to implement policy for the entire state.5 7
Second, the Court cautioned other states that they could not effectively
shield their local governments from liability by manipulating the titles
of their state officers. This is because plaintiffs could still prove a
widespread practice of constitutional violations under county auspices by
showing custom or usage having the force of law, instead of showing
constitutional injury inflicted by a county policymaker18
In two Eleventh Circuit decisions before Manders, the court followed
McMillian by cloaking Alabama sheriffs with that state's Eleventh
Amendment immunity from liability for damages in federal court actions
under § 1983. In Thrquitt v. Jefferson County,5 9 the Eleventh Circuit
held the county not liable for the sheriff's negligent supervision of the
county jail because the Alabama county lacked control over the sheriff's
performance of such duties. 60 The court noted that even though the
Alabama Constitution clearly labeled the sheriff as a state officer,
McMillian required a state-law analysis of which government body
actually exercised control over the sheriff's duty at issue.61

53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

Id.
Id. at 791-93.
See Hess v. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 513 U.S. 30 (1994).
McMillian, 520 U.S. at 793.
Id. at 793-95.
Id. at 796.
137 F.3d 1285 (1998).
Id. at 1286.
Id. at 1288.
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The court in Grech v. Clayton County6 2 relied on McMillian and
Turquitt for the proposition that a "sheriff's policy or act cannot be said
to speak for the county if the county has no say in what policy or action
the sheriff takes."6 3 This is because a contrary holding would impose
on the government entity formally employing the actual constitutional
injury inflictor a form of respondeat superior liability rejected by the
Supreme Court in Monell." Under Georgia law, the Eleventh Circuit
held that Clayton County was not liable for a sheriff's improper
maintenance of the Criminal Justice Information System6 5 network
because. the county had no control over the sheriff's performance of this
function."6
In the Eleventh Amendment context, the Supreme Court has provided
additional guidance on the question of when a sub-state entity may be
In Hess v. Port
deemed to be acting on behalf of the state itself.
Authority Trans-HudsonCorp.," the Supreme Court examined whether
a bi-state entity, created under the Compact Clause and run by the
federal government and two states, was entitled to Eleventh Amendment
immunity. Because the indicators of immunity pointed in different
directions, the Court held that the twin justifications for Eleventh
Amendment immunity-protection of state treasuries against judgments
and the integrity of the states within the federal system-should guide
the analysis. 8 Thus, the merits of each competing factor were evaluated against the twin reasons for immunity in order to measure their
comparative weight. 9 The Court rejected assigning decisive weight to
the state's control over the bi-state entity, saying that states always
Instead, the
exercise ultimate control over every state entity.70
that
will
be given
implication of the state's purse is the salient factor
71
decisive weight when it points toward immunity.
In Regents of the University of Californiav. Doe,72 the Supreme Court
clarified the "money-judgments factor," holding that a state university's

62.

335 F.3d 1326 (2003). Grech was issued three weeks prior to Manders. However,

it did not command a majority opinion.
63. Id. at 1331.
64. Id. at 1341.
65. CJIS is a statewide database accessible to law enforcement agencies throughout
Georgia. Id. at 1327.
66. Id. at 1348.
67. 513 U.S. 30 (1994).
68. Id. at 47.
69. Id. at 49-53.
70. Id. at 47-48.
71. Id. at 48-49.

72. 519 U.S. 425 (1997).
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Eleventh Amendment immunity was not undermined by its potential
indemnification by the federal government."3 The Court reasoned that
the state's integrity is implicated by the mere risk of adverse judgment,
even if the state does not actually pay the judgment, and held that it is
the state's "potential legal liability" that is relevant.74

III. COURT'S RATIONALE
The Eleventh Circuit in Manders v. Lee,7" confronting the same
question the Supreme Court addressed in McMillian (although under
Georgia rather than Alabama law), departed from the McMillian
analogue by relying on a blend of Supreme Court § 1983 municipal
liability doctrine and Eleventh Amendment doctrine as previously
elaborated by the Eleventh Circuit itself. The court applied its own fourfactor Eleventh Amendment test for determining if a Georgia county
sheriff is an arm of the state when carrying out the particular functions
at issue.7" Formally, the opinion was obedient to McMillian, first by
setting out the function at issue and then observing that state law is
determinative of this federal question."
While being placed in his jail cell, Manders was subjected to constitutionally violative conduct at the hands of the sheriff's deputy; accordingly, the majority defined the sheriff's function in this context as establishing a use-of-force policy at the jail and training and disciplining his
deputies in that regard, 8 as opposed to the dissent's characterization
of "operating a county jail." The majority regarded the dissent's view
of the sheriff's function as being imprecise and abstract, ° and emphasized that the proper assessment is not whether Sheriff Peterson acts on
behalf of the state in an all-or-nothing categorical approach, but rather
73. Id. at 431.
74. Id.
75. 338 F.3d 1304 (11th Cir. 2003).
76. Id. at 1308-09.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 1333.
80. At the heart of the debate between the majority and dissent over the proper
definition of the function at issue is the implication of the majority's definition. The
dissent contends that "use of force" is a general attribute of the sheriffs office that is
implicated to a greater or lesser degree by every action of the sheriff. Because "use of
force" is a pervasive attribute of the sheriffs office, the majority's definition of function is
applicable not just in jails but on highways and virtually anywhere the sheriff executes his
duties. Even though the majority characterizes the dissenting formulation as being an
abstract "all-or-nothing" definition, the dissent points out that not only is their formulation
established by precedent, but it focuses the analysis on determinative, positive state law.
Id. at 1309 n.9.
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"in light of the particular function in which the defendant was engaged
when taking the actions out of which liability is asserted to arise.
The majority turned to the sheriff's constitutional definition and
statutory relationship to the county and the state.8 2 In Georgia, the
sheriff is elected by the people of the county but holds a constitutional
office that exists separate from the county.83 In some respects the state
legislature has control over the sheriff because it controls the qualifications for election of sheriffs and their minimum salary." Moreover,
Georgia law expressly forbids the county from exercising control over a
sheriff's force policy."5 The sheriff exercises sole discretion in the hiring
of deputies, who are considered employees not of the county but of the
sheriff.8 6 For these reasons, the sheriff is an officer of the state, and
thus the state's constitutional designation of sheriffs as "county officers"
is merely a label describing where the sheriff operates and is elected
instead of defining his office."7
The majority then proceeded to outline the sheriff's functions and
duties, which they characterized as (1) law enforcement; (2) state courts;
and (3) corrections. 8 The majority also noted the state's singular role
in granting these powers to the sheriff, and assigning and controlling the
sheriff's exercise of these duties.89 Law enforcement relates to a
sheriff's duty "to enforce the laws and act on behalf of the sovereign
State,"9 ° an observation made by the Court in McMillian when the
Justices noted that the Alabama sheriff was an officer of that state
charged with keeping the peace in the county where he is elected.9
Further, Georgia law assigns sheriffs an integral role in operating the
superior courts, which are the trial courts of general jurisdiction in
Georgia.92 These duties, ranging from mandatory attendance at all
sessions of court, enforcement of state court orders, authorization of

81. Id. at 1308.
82. Id. at 1310.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 1311.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 1312.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. (citing O.C.G.A. § 15-16-10(a)(1)-(8)). The court also notes the availability of
other state actors, the Georgia State Patrol and the Georgia Bureau of Investigation, in law
enforcement activity. Id. at 1313 n.16.
91. Id. at 1313 (citing McMillian v. Monroe County, 520 U.S. 781 (1997)).
92. Id. at 1314.
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bonding companies, and others, are discrete state functions delegated
specifically to Georgia sheriffs. 93
Regarding corrections, at issue in Manders, the majority examined the
rules governing incarceration of Georgia state prisoners in county jails,
and the role Georgia sheriffs play in managing those jails.9 4 The court
concluded that Georgia law addressing these points represents Georgia
state management and control over the Georgia sheriff, whereas the
county has no authority over the Georgia sheriff's corrections duties,
including which offenders serve time in county jails and who is in charge
of those jails. 95 The majority concluded that a sheriff in Georgia is an
officer of the state even though he acts within an assigned county and
is elected by county voters. 6
Having completed the examination of Georgia law, the majority
applied the four Eleventh Amendment factors elaborated by the
Eleventh Circuit to the sheriff's functions of establishing force policy and
training and disciplining his deputies in that regard. 97 Beginning with
how "state law defines the entity," the court stressed that the authority
to use force is derived from the state and is a state function regardless
of the context surrounding the employment of force. 98 This factor thus
weighs heavily in favor of characterizing the Georgia sheriff as a state
officer regarding this function. 99
The second factor, "where Georgia law vests control," points to
identifying the Georgia sheriff as a state officer because only the state
has control over the sheriff's force policy.0 0 Under Georgia law the
state requires county sheriffs to undergo annual training, funded by the
state, which presumably includes instruction on force policy and deputy
Further, the governor alone may investigate the sheriff
training.'
and discipline the sheriff for the violation of his duties.0 2 Meanwhile,
the county has no control over or involvement in the0 3sheriff's force policy
and only possesses control over separate matters.
For the court, the third factor, "where the entity derives its funds,"
showed sufficient state involvement to tip the balance in favor of

93. Id. at 1314-15.
94. Id. at 1315-19.
95. Id. at 1317.

96. Id. at 1318.
97. Id. at 1318-19.
98. Id.

99. Id.
100.
101.
102.
103.

Id. at 1320.
Id. at 1321.
Id.
Id. at 1322.
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Even though the county supplies
Eleventh Amendment immunity."
the majority of the sheriff's budget, the majority found persuasive the
state's involvement with funding particular aspects of the function at
issue, such as "the annual training of sheriffs, [and] the [g]overnor's
1 5
disciplinary procedure over sheriffs for use of excessive force." "
Furthermore, the majority reasoned that county funding grants the
county attenuated control, at best, over the sheriff because the state
mandates that the county pay the sheriff a minimum salary and official
bond amounts, and the county cannot dictate how the sheriff must spend
the funds allocated by the county. 06
The majority denied that the fourth factor, "liability for and payment
10 7
of adverse judgments," defeated Eleventh Amendment immunity.
After pointing out that the sheriff's office alone is liable for adverse
judgments, the majority said that to the extent adverse judgments create
deficiencies in the sheriff's budget, both county and state funds are
implicated when recouping the losses because both the county and state
However, as the Supreme Court wrote
ultimately fund the sheriff.'
in Regents of the University of Californiav. Doe, °9 an actual drain on
the state treasury is not required because the Eleventh Amendment's
main focus is on respecting the dignity and integrity of each state in the
federal system."0 The majority found this factor insufficient to defeat
Eleventh Amendment immunity because these concerns are not limited
to who pays for adverse judgments."'
Having concluded that the first two factors weigh heavily in favor of
immunity, the third factor tilts in favor of immunity, and the fourth, at
a minimum, does not defeat immunity, the court held that the sheriff
2
acts as an arm of the state when enacting force policy." The court
narrow issue
to
the
was quick to point out that the decision was limited
decided that day, but authored a footnote suggesting that Georgia
sheriffs act on behalf of the county3 in providing, or failing to provide,
medical care at the jails they run."1

104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

Id. at 1323.
Id.
Id. at 1324.
Id.
Id. at 1327.
519 U.S. 425 (1997).
338 F.3d at 1327.
Id. at 1328.
Id. at 1328-29.
Id. at 1328-29, 1323 n.43.
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A.

Anderson Dissent
Judge Anderson, dissenting, wrote that the majority misapplied the
Eleventh Amendment analysis because the twin reasons for Eleventh
Amendment immunity, as laid out in Hess, should be the guide when
immunity indicators do not point in the same direction."4 Here, Judge
Anderson did not see any greater threat to the dignity of the state by
this suit than would occur by an identical suit brought against a city or
county."5 Second, he read the Supreme Court's opinion in Hess to
hold that the liability-for-judgment factor is the paramount inquiry in
Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence, displacing the significance afforded
to the control factor." 6 While ultimate control over every sub-state
entity lies with the state, focusing on the control factor fails to address
the central, overriding reason behind the Eleventh Amendment-protecting the state purse from adverse judgments."' Using
these two reasons as a guide, Judge Anderson would hold that the
sheriff is not an arm of the state and thus is liable under § 1983."'
B.

Barkett Dissent
Judge Barkett, also dissenting, accused the majority of subverting the
law of local government liability."9 In her view, the pivotal error in
the majority's analysis was the misidentification of the function at
issue. 2 ° This error allowed the majority to loosen the Eleventh
Amendment immunity analysis from its moorings.' 21 In the past, the
Eleventh Circuit has treated the function in § 1983 claims dealing with
the mistreatment of inmates as "operating a county jail."'2
By
defining the function in this case as "use of force," the majority elevated
23
a general attribute of the sheriff's office to the level of a function.
In the process, the majority departed from the reason the Supreme Court
gave in McMillian for identifying the function'24 in the first place, to

114. Id. at 1329-30 (Anderson, J., dissenting).
115. Id. at 1330 (Anderson, J., dissenting).
116. Id. at 1330 (Anderson, J., dissenting).
117. Id. at 1330-31 (Anderson, J., dissenting).
118. Id. at 1331 (Anderson, J., dissenting).
119. Id. at 1332 (Barkett, J., dissenting).
120. Id. (Barkett, J., dissenting).
121. Id. (Barkett, J., dissenting).
122. Id. (Barkett, J., dissenting).
123. Id. at 1333 (Barkett, J., dissenting).
124. The majority's definition of function is even more puzzling when one considers that
later in the opinion it only identifies three functions of the sheriff under Georgia law:
corrections, law enforcement, and state courts. Id. at 1312-18.
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focus the analysis on the positive state law that defines the area of
official responsibility at issue.125 The lack of direct state law authority
on the use-of-force function forced the majority to draw inferences from
virtually the entire code and constitution, resulting in two misstatements of law having tremendous importance and implication.'26
First, the majority suggested that sheriffs are state agents merely
because the state confers on sheriffs the authority to use force; by
implication then, all law enforcement officers, from city police to
department store security guards, would be state officers because their
authority to use force is also granted by the state.121 Second, the
majority suggested that the sheriff is immune from suit because the
legislature outlines the powers and duties of the sheriff's office. 28 The
full application of this argument would obliterate the distinction between
local and state government because all local government is created by
outlining of the powers and duties of government
the legislature's
9
offices.

12

Judge Barkett identified the function at issue as "operating a county
jail," 3 ° and applying the same four-factor Eleventh Amendment test
used by the majority, concluded that a Georgia sheriff acts on the
county's behalf when operating the county jail.'3' With regard to the
first factor, the definition of a sheriff's office and jails under state
law, 32 Judge Barkett rested her analysis on her previous discussion
of the topic in Grech v. Clayton County"3 wherein she elaborated on
the Georgia Constitution's designation of sheriffs as county officers." 4
An examination of the statutory law governing the function at issue
further "complements the constitution's definition of the sheriff's
office,"' 3 ' and the majority was able to set aside this clear constitutional and statutory authority and reach a contrary conclusion only by
defining function in a "novel" manner.3 6

125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.

Id. at 1333 (Barkett, J., dissenting).
Id. (Barkett, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1334 (Barkett, J., dissenting).
Id. (Barkett, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1335 (Barkett, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1333 (Barkett, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1335 (Barkett, J., dissenting).
Id. (Barkett, J., dissenting).
335 F.3d 1326 (11th Cir. 2003).
Id. at 1326 n.8 (Barkett, J., concurring).
338 F.3d at 1335 (Barkett, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1336 (Barkett, J., dissenting).
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The second factor, "degree of control maintained by the state" likewise
pointed in favor of labeling the sheriff as a county officer.'37 Counties
in Georgia fund and build jails that are run by their sheriffs and
overseen by the county commissioner, whereas the state maintains its
own distinct network of correctional facilities run by wardens and
overseen by the Department of Corrections. 138 Thus, Sheriff Peterson's
administration of the Clinch County Jail is independent and free from
Further, the majority's
oversight by state corrections officials.' 39
misidentification of the relevant function allowed it to rely on the yearly
training requirement and governor oversight of the sheriff as support for
the conclusion that the sheriff is a state officer. 40 But the majority
overreaches by relying on the mere existence of a state-mandated
training requirement for establishing state control because such
requirements are just part of the sovereign state's regulatory control; the
state-mandated training requirement for the county commissioner or a
lawyer does not likewise subject 4them to state control for purposes of
Eleventh Amendment immunity.1 1
For Judge Barkett, the third factor, "the source of funds," strongly
points to labeling the sheriff as county officer because the county not
only funds the sheriff's entire operating budget, it appropriates funds for
the function at issue. 14 As is the case with the other factors, the
majority's error begins with the misidentification of the relevant function
at issue. The majority relied primarily on the state's funding of the
state-mandated training and governor oversight of sheriffs to label
sheriffs as state actors. The majority failed, however, to explain how
several days of training and the possible cost of investigation for
misconduct outweighs the county's daily cost of operating and maintaining the jail.'" Further, by discounting the county's complete funding
of the sheriff's budget, the majority downplays the degree of control
actually exercised by the county. More important, even if county
funding of the sheriff grants the county only attenuated control over the
sheriff, the state clearly exercises no control over the sheriff's expenditures.'"

137. Id. at 1339 (Barkett, J., dissenting).
138. Id. at 1342 (Barkett, J., dissenting).
139. Id. at 1344 (Barkett, J., dissenting).
140. Id. at 1345 (Barkett, J., dissenting).
141. Id. at 1343-44 (Barkett, J., dissenting).
142. Id. at 1344-45 (Barkett, J., dissenting).
143. Id. at 1345 (Barkett, J., dissenting).
144. Id. at 1346 (Barkett, J., dissenting).
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Judge Barkett emphasized that the fourth factor, "liability for and
payment of adverse judgments," being the most important factor in the
Eleventh Amendment analysis, cuts strongly against the sheriff being
cloaked with Eleventh Amendment immunity.145 For the foregoing
reasons, Judge Barkett concluded that sheriffs in Georgia operate county
jails for the counties in which they serve.146
IV. IMPLICATIONS

The aftermath of Manders means that a citizen will not be able to
bring a § 1983 claim against a sheriff in his official capacity in federal
court if the sheriff's action at issue was done while executing an
application of force. In federal court then, the citizen seeking redress for
a Georgia county sheriff's use of force can no longer state a claim against
the county because Manders deems the sheriff to be acting on behalf of
the state; in effect, that claim founders on the element of causation. Nor
would that claim lie against the state, which would be granted Eleventh
Amendment immunity for the same reason. The citizen would be left
with the option of bringing a § 1983 action for injunctive relief, with the
possible eligibility for attorney fees. The citizen might also bring a suit
against a Georgia county sheriff in his personal capacity, subject to
qualified immunity. Even if the suit overcomes the qualified-immunity
hurdle, the possibility still exists that the sheriff will not be indemnified
or solvent to pay the judgment.
Not only is the citizen effectively barred from bringing a § 1983 claim
in federal court against a sheriff, but it is ultimately unlikely that the
same claim can be brought in state court because of state law sovereign
immunity rules. Even if the § 1983 claim in state court proceeded past
the immunity hurdle, the citizen would face the prospect of litigating a
claim against a sheriff with the county citizens who elected the sheriff
serving as jurors in the suit. The overall effect of Manders then is to
eradicate any remedy that was available under § 1983 when the
constitutionally violative conduct was a sheriff's use of force.
Aside from the implication for § 1983 claims against a sheriff for use
of force, Manders creates considerable uncertainty in the area of § 1983
liability and Eleventh Amendment immunity for Georgia sheriffs in
particular, and sheriffs generally. Will Georgia sheriffs become state
actors for all law enforcement functions, or will a case-by-case analysis
be required, leaving prospective plaintiffs to engage in a guessing game
as to whether a sheriff will be a county or state actor with respect to

145. Id. at 1347 (Barkett, J., dissenting).
146. Id. at 1347-48 (Barkett, J., dissenting).
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particular functions? The majority did seem to indicate that the Georgia
sheriff is acting on behalf of the county when providing medical aid to
inmates at the county jail, 47 but beyond this function Manders seems
to point toward finding the sheriff as acting on behalf of the state absent
clear statutory authority to the contrary because use of force is
implicated by virtually every act of the sheriff.
If the sheriff is held to be acting as state policymaker for Georgia,
then the sheriff could fall under the scope of the Georgia Tort Claims
Act"4 ("GCTA") if Georgia courts follow the analysis of Manders.
Because the GCTA provides "the exclusive remedy for any tort committed by a state officer or employee acting within the scope of his or her
official employment duties," 4 9 the sheriff could then avail himself of
the protections and immunities provided by the GCTA.
THOMAS B. WARD

147. Id. at 1323 n.43; see also O.C.G.A. § 42-5-2 (2003).
148. O.C.G.A. § 50-21-20 (2003).
149. O.C.G.A § 50-21-25(a) (2003).
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